A precise security analysis of practical quantum key distribution (QKD) systems is an important step for improving their performance. Here we consider a class of quantum soft filtering operations, which generalizes the unambiguous state discrimination (USD) technique. These operations can be applied as a basis for a security analysis of the original coherent one-way (COW) QKD protocol since their application interpolates between beam-splitting (BS) and USD attacks. We demonstrate that a zero-error attack based on quantum soft filtering operations gives a larger amount of the information for Eve at a given level of losses. We calculate the Eve information as a function of the channel length. The efficiency of the proposed attack highly depends on the level of the monitoring under the maintenance of the statistics of control (decoy) states, and best-case results are achieved in the case of the absence of maintenance of control state statistics. Our results form additional requirements for the analysis of practical QKD systems based on the COW QKD protocol and its variants by providing an upper bound on the security.
I. INTRODUCTION
QKD is a method that allows establishing unconditionally secure communications between distinct legitimate parties [1] [2] [3] [4] . An important step in the practical implementation of QKD devices is a comprehensive analysis both from the viewpoint of hardware attacks and subtle questions of realizing QKD protocols [2] . A peculiarity of the security analysis of QKD protocols is the fact that the eavesdropper is limited by laws of physics only, whereas all advanced technological and computational resources are available for attacks. The significant progress on the security analysis of QKD protocols against general attacks has been performed [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] . Experimental and industrial realizations of QKD devices have also reached key distribution of reasonable rates over distances of 100 km (for a review, see Ref. [4] ).
The class of QKD protocols that is of specific interest for the analysis is related to methods, which are used in existing commercial QKD devices. Examples include, in particular, the distributed-phase-reference (DPR) approach [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] , specifically, differential-phase-shift [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] and COW [16] [17] [18] [19] QKD protocols. A general security proof of DPR-QKD in a realistic setting has been missing, and only particular cases have been considered [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] . This problem has been recently generally resolved, and lower bounds for a special variant of the COW protocol have been obtained [29] . Nevertheless, the search for security bounds for various implementations of COW-like schemes still is an important research activity in the theory of quantum key distribution. An important concept in the security analysis of COW-like protocols is zeroerror attacks based on the USD technique [21] . In this case, Eve can take advantage only of the losses, so the attack combines three USD strategies and preserves all the observed detection rates in Bob's detectors.
In this work, we consider a general class of quantum operations, so-called quantum soft filtering, which can be used for obtaining security bounds for COW-like protocols. We demonstrate that in the context of the COW security analysis, quantum soft filtering operations interpolate between standard BS attack and USD technique. If applied as a basis for an attack scenario in the COW QKD protocol, quantum soft filtering operations give a larger amount of the information for Eve at a given level of losses. We calculate the Eve information as a function of the channel length and show the efficiency of attacks based on soft filtering operations highly depends on the level of the control under the maintenance of statistics of control (decoy) states. Our results are of interest for obtaining upper bounds on the security for practical QKD systems based the COW QKD protocol and its variants.
Our work is organized as follows. In Sec. II, we briefly review the COW QKD protocol and zero-error attacks. In Sec. III, we discuss quantum soft filtering operations. In Sec. IV, we obtain improved security bounds for the COW protocol using an attack based on quantum soft filtering operations. We discuss the correspondence between quantum soft filtering and BS-based and USDbased attacks. In Sec. V. we discuss the obtained results and compare them with BS and USD attacks. We discuss main results and conclude in Sec. VI.
II. COW PROTOCOL AND ZERO-ERROR ATTACKS
Here we remind the idea of the COW protocol [16] [17] [18] [19] . The basic scenario is that Alice encodes bits using time slots containing either vacuum |0 or signal |α states, where the mean number of photons µ = |α| 2 < 1. The logical bit corresponds to sequences |0 |α and |α |0 . In order to prevent attacks, Alice also sends control states of arXiv:1910.06167v1 [quant-ph] 14 Oct 2019 the form |α |α (they also called decoy states). Alice produces each bit value with probability (1 − f )/2, whereas with the probability f she sends the decoy sequence.
The prepared quantum states are then sent to Bob through a quantum channel with length L and the corresponding transmittance t = 10 −δL , where δ is the attenuation coefficient. On the detection side, Bob registers the time-of-arrival of the photons on detectors D B for providing the raw key and checks the statistics for the detections on detectors D Mi in the monitoring line for destructive interference of decoy and information sequences [18] . After the formation of the raw key, Alice and Bob implement a post-processing procedure and, in particular, check the statistical parameters of the protocol. Specifically, the important stage is to check detection rates.
That is why the most interesting class of attacks that should be taken into account for obtaining the corresponding bounds for COW-like QKD protocols is zeroerror attacks [21] . This class of attacks does not introduce any errors in usually checked parameters of the protocol, such as quantum bit error rate (QBER) and the visibility of an interferometer. The simplest example of such an attack is the BS attack. In the BS attack, Eve simulates the lossy channel by extracting the (1 − t) fraction of the signal with a beam-splitter, and then sends expected fraction t to Bob on a lossless line. The main advantage of this attack is the fact that beam-splitter is equivalent to losses in the transmission channel, so the attack is always possible and is impossible to detect by monitoring the data of Alice and Bob. However, this attack is not very powerful since the Eve information tends to the Holevo information [30] of initial states rather than to unity.
Another basis for zero-error attacks is to use USD technique. In this attack, Eve tries to extract the full information from transmitted quantum states and block them once she fails. The USD-based attack has been in details considered in Refs. [21, 24] , where each of three USD strategies is to distinguish sequences that begin and end with the vacuum state, in particular sequences |0α0 , |0α : α0 and |0 : αα : 0 , that allows leaving zero value of QBER and the visibility equal to unity.
III. QUANTUM SOFT FILTERING
Here we consider quantum soft filtering operations, which as we demonstrate generalize the USD-technique. These operations correspond to probabilistic information extraction. For a pair of non-orthogonal states |a 0 and |a 1 , quantum soft filtering operations in the Stinespring representation (also known as the Stinespring dilation) are as follows:
where b 0 |b 1 < a 0 |a 1 and s|f = 0. Eq. (1) has the following physical meaning: One can whether make the states {|a 0 , |a 1 } more distinguishable with success probability p, that yields the "success" signal |s , or one can fail with the probability 1 − p and get the failure signal |f . We note that auxiliary states |s and |f help to reveal whether the soft filtering operation was successful, or the states passed into vacuum. Due to the fact that |s and |f are orthogonal, one can distinguish successful and unsuccessful applications of the operations.
Unitarity of quantum soft filtering (1) gives the following condition on the conservation of the scalar product between the original and final states:
Thus, from the unitary condition, the success probability is as follows:
There are two notable particular cases of soft filtering operations. First is "doing nothing", where a i and b i are the same and the success probability is equal to unity. Second is USD discrimination, where b 0 |b 1 = 0 and the success probability is 1 − a 0 |a 1 . We should note that the possibility to use filtering operations and their generalizations has been considered in various contexts, in particular for the analysis of other QKD protocols, such as BB84 [31] and DPS [24, 32] .
IV. SECURITY BOUNDS FOR COW USING QUANTUM SOFT FILTERING
Here we demonstrate that quantum soft filtering is helpful for obtaining security bounds for COW-like protocols in its original version. The attack based on quantum soft filtering operations has a number of important features. First, our attack is adaptive, i.e. the strategy of the attack depends on the results of the previous steps. Second, in this attack Eve does not waste its resources, i.e. the possibility to block some states, on the discrimination between vacuum and decoy states. This allows focusing the attention on the discrimination between information states since the position of the states will be announced later. Third, the attack is designed in a zero-error manner. In the view of the fact that COWlike protocols are widely used in experiments on QKD, it represents an interesting scheme for illustrating the application of quantum soft filtering.
A. Attack scenario
The attack scenario assumes that Eve works with the tuples of the states, that begin and end with vacuum state |0 in analogy to the USD-based attack. Then some of these tuples should be blocked by Eve, and the rest reaches Bob with higher intensity so that the average detection rate remains the same as expected by Bob and the visibility remains constant. Eve should also preserve the percentage of control states so that the legitimate users could not detect the attack by the statistical changes. The attack consists of several stages.
(i) On the first stage, Eve tries to find a vacuum state by measuring each state while blocking the other signals where vacuum states were not obtained. For an information state, the probability of successful vacuum discrimination (Z) is 1 − e −µ A .
(ii) On the second stage, Eve starts forming the tuple for the found position of the vacuum state. Then she performs a small number T SF 1 of SF1 operations, which can be defined by the following Stinespring representation:
where the states {|β |0 , |0 |β , |β |β } belong to the Bob subspace, and the states {|s , |f } and {|ε 1 |0 , |0 |ε 1 , |E } belong to the Eve subspace. Here the state |E belongs to the 2-dimensional subspace spanned by the states |ε 1 |0 and |0 |ε 1 , and if we denote cos ε 1 = e −|ε1| 2 , then
where |E lies between |ε 1 |0 and |0 |ε 1 . In our attack strategy, Eve blocks the whole tuple in case any of these SF1 operations fail.
The SF1 operation is useful for increasing the portion of control states after the attack. If we denote µ A = |α| 2 , µ B = |β| 2 and µ E1 = |ε 1 | 2 , then unitary conditions read
From this expression it is possible to extract the success probability q 1 for the control states as follows: One can see that if µ B is not too large, then q 1 is higher than p 1 . So in this case SF1 operation increases the portion of control states. We note that for large values of µ E1 and not very large values of µ B , SF1 operation implements a sort of USD for the information states, but without modifying control states that reach the Bob side and without trying to discriminate between information and control states. This information will be obtained later.
(iii) On the third stage, Eve performs a number of SF2 operations, which are defined as follows:
with similar notations µ A = |α| 2 , µ B = |β| 2 and µ E2 = |ε 2 | 2 . The unitary conditions take a simple form
SF2 operation applies to the sequence from left to right until the first failure or T SF 2 successes in a row. Then Eve performs the vacuum discrimination operation over both Bob's and Eve's modes, from right to left starting from the latest signal with successful SF2 operation. The probability of successful vacuum discrimination for any information state is 1−e −(µ B +µ E2 ) . We note that SF2 decreases the percentage of control states, which is helpful for the case when the following operation is the vacuum states |0 discrimination.
After vacuum discrimination, the tuple is successfully formed and the attack is completed.
(iv) If Eve fails to find the vacuum in any positions with successful SF2 operation then attack is considered to be failed for this tuple and all the pulses are blocked.
We note that the efficiency of the attack depends on how strictly it is required to maintain the statistics of control states in the pulses that reached Bob. If not to follow the statistics, no SF1 operations are needed. Then the attack becomes much more efficient, otherwise the attack is less efficient, but still should be taken into account at long distances.
Let us consider Eve's information in the case of successful attack and calculate it after the announcement of the positions of information states. If SF1 has been applied successfully for information states then the Eve information is given by the Holevo value of the states |0 |ε 1 and |ε 1 |0 in her quantum memory, which is equal to χ 1 =h 2 [(1−e −µ E 1 ) /2]. The same holds for SF2 and the corresponding Eve information is as follows:
For the vacuum discrimination at the beginning and the end of the attack Eve obtains the full information or nothing with the probability equal to 1/2 for both cases.
B. Example
Let us consider a simple example of the application of the attack (see Fig. 1 ). Suppose that the sequence of logical bits c01c10110 corresponds to |α 1 |α 1 |α 2 |0 2 |0 3 |α 3 |α 4 |α 4 |0 5 |α 5 |α 6 |0 6 |0 7 |α 7 0 8 |α 8 |α 9 |0 9 .
where subindex stands for the signal number. In the considered case Eve is unable to find the vacuum states in first two signals (1 and 2) and she succeeds in the case of 3rd signal only. Then for signals 4 and 5 Eve successfully realizes SF1 operation and SF2 for 6, 7, and 8. In the case of signal 9 Eve does not succeed in applying SF 2. So the starts to find the vacuum state. This is unsuccessful for signals 8, but works for 7. Therefore, she can send a tuple of states with intensity µ B between signals 3 and 7 as follows:
Finally, Eve extracts one bit from signal 3, nothing from signal 4 since this is the control state, the bound for the Holevo information χ 5 = h 2 [1/2 (1 − e −µ E 1 )] and χ 6 = h 2 [1/2 (1 − e −µ E 2 )] from signals 5 and 6, correspondingly; and nothing form signal 7.
C. Analysis
Let us consider an expression for the successful probability of applying SF1 and SF2 operations. The total probability is sum of success probabilities for signal and control (decoy) states, which is as follows:
Then the fractions of the control states after successful applying SF1 and SF2 operations have the following form:
For a given tuple we can calculate the success probability and the portion of control states after forming this tuple as well as Eve's information. Then we can obtain an average value of the Eve's information and the control states portion as the expectation values for any given attack parameters, i.e.
• the number of SF1 operations T SF 1 ;
• the maximum number of SF2 operations T SF 2 ;
• Bob's states intensity µ B ;
• Eve's state intensity after applying SF1 µ E1 ;
• Eve's state intensity after applying SF1 µ E2 .
Also for a set of these parameters one can calculate the average detector click probability on the Bob side that gives the channel length between Alice and Bob, for which this attack is possible. The Eve's goal is to find the set of parameters maximizing her information for the given channel length with preserving the statistics of control states (if it is required).
We note that Eve can use probabilistic strategy, where she employs various sets of parameters with corresponding probabilities.
D. USD-like attack
For the considered attack the Eve information is not equal to unity. If we additionally require this condition then we can construct a sort of USD-like attack, where Eve extracts full information or blocks the tuple. The USD-like attack corresponds to the following set of parameters: µ E1 = µ E2 = +∞ and T SF 2 = 1.
We note that the attack proposed in Ref. [21] has difficulties with the neighborhood of information and control states, which can be resolved by applying our attack. Our USD-like attack does not block the sequence |0 |α : |α |α , and for it this sequence does not differ from the sequence |α |0 : |α |α . We also note that our USDlike takes benefit of making the decision in the process of attack and is not focused on any particular strategy.
V. RESULTS
We present results of the analysis of the suggested attack in Fig. 2 . Specifically, we present the key rate for our proposed attack and BS attack at the detector efficiency η = 0.1 and δ = 0.25 dB/km as a function of the length a) b)
Distance (km) Distance (km) Figure 2 . In (a) we present the key rate for proposed and beam-splitting attacks with parameters η = 0.1 and δ = 0.25 dB/km as a function of the length of the channel between Alice and Bob. In (b) we show optimal mean photon number for three attacks (the proposed attack, BS and USD-like attacks) with parameters η = 0.1 and δ = 0.25 dB/km as a function of the length of the channel between Alice and Bob. The parameters are the same as in Ref. [21] .
of the channel between Alice and Bob. As we show in Fig. 2 (a) the suggested attack is better than BS attack on the whole range of channel lengths. We note that this is not the case for the original USD attack, which is better than the BS attack starting from distances more that 100 km. In a sence the BS attack is close to a particular case of our attack for the following set of parameters:
In Fig. 2 (b) we present optimal intensities for our attack and BS attack as well as the maximum intensity starting from which Eve is able to extract full information via USD-like attack scenario. One can see that the suggested attack improves the results of Ref. [21] . As in the case of the USD attack, there is no claim of optimality of the suggested attack based on quantum soft filtering operations.
VI. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
In conclusion, we have considered the applications of quantum soft filtering operations for obtaining security bounds for COW-like protocols. We have demonstrated that in the context of the COW security analysis, quantum soft filtering operations interpolate between standard BS attack and USD technique. We have also considered a special class of attacks based on quantum soft filtering operations, where it is required for Eve information to be unity. We have shown that the suggested attack outperforms the BS attack on the whole range of channel lengths and improves the attack based on the USD strategy. We then expect that our results are of interest for obtaining upper bounds on the security for practical QKD systems based the COW QKD protocol and its variants.
In particular, here we have considered the original version of the COW protocol. However, there are its modifications, which use other pairs of signals as information states. We note that it is possible to use our approach to form a tuple of pulses which starts and ends with vacuum states (and can have vacuum states within) and therefore maintains correct visibility, but for which Eve's information is high. However, the precise algorithm for various modifications of the COW protocol is beyond the scope of the present work.
